The Art of War/ Strategisches Risiko


Girl Reading on Beach – Tel Aviv

Eyal Weizman versus Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, “frieze” versus “Welt”. Die Kunst der Politik und die Kunst des Krieges: ein funkelnder Polarstern, zwei Denkrichtungen: Tausend Plateuas und amerikanischer Pragmatismus, inside the war machine und facing reality. Kein Gespräch, just a form of overlapping. Und wo sind wir, frage ich D.

Weizman: The Israeli Defence Forces have been heavily influenced by contemporary philosophy, highlighting the fact that there is considerable overlap among theoretical texts deemed essential by military academies and architectural schools The attack conducted by units of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) on the city of Nablus in April 2002 was described by its commander, Brigadier-General Aviv Kokhavi, as ‘inverse geometry’, which he explained as ‘the reorganization of the urban syntax by means of a series of micro-tactical actions’.1 During the battle soldiers moved within the city across hundreds of metres of ‘overground tunnels’ carved out through a dense and contiguous urban structure. Although several thousand soldiers and Palestinian guerrillas were manoeuvring simultaneously in the city, they were so ‘saturated’ into the urban fabric that very few would have been visible from the air. Furthermore, they used none of the city’s streets, roads, alleys or courtyards, or any of the external doors, internal stairwells and windows, but moved horizontally through walls and vertically through holes blasted in ceilings and floors. This form of movement, described by the military as ‘infestation’, seeks to redefine inside as outside, and domestic interiors as thoroughfares. The IDF’s strategy of ‘walking through walls’ involves a conception of the city as not just the site but also the very medium of warfare – a flexible, almost liquid medium that is forever contingent and in flux.

Goldhagen: Nun, da die Waffen überwiegend schweigen, kann ein Blick zurück uns helfen, nach vorn zu schauen. Das für das Verständnis des Krieges im Libanon und die andauernde Veränderung der Geopolitik des Nahostkonflikts durch die Hisbollah entscheidende Ereignis findet sich zu Beginn des gegenwärtigen Konflikts. Es geht dabei nicht um die Entführung zweier israelischer Soldaten am 12. Juli, sondern um das Verhalten der Hisbollah unmittelbar danach. Als Israel die Entführungen und die im Norden Israels einschlagenden Katjuscha-Raketen als die Kriegshandlungen verstand, die sie darstellten, bewies die Hisbollah, indem sie sich gegen die Freilassung von zwei Soldaten entschied, dass sie eine fortschreitende, groß angelegte Zerstörung des Libanon bevorzugte.
Zum zweiten Mal in der langen Geschichte des Nahostkonflikts gab ein Feind Israels damit praktisch zu verstehen: Es ist uns egal, was ihr tut. Es ist uns egal, ob unsere Kriegsführung euch dazu bringt, unsere Städte anzugreifen, unsere Wirtschaft zu ruinieren, unsere Menschen zu töten. Was am meisten zählt, ist, euch Schaden zuzufügen, eure Moral zu schwächen und euch dazu zu treiben, große Teile unseres Landes zu zerstören und unsere Kinder zu töten und damit eure internationale Verurteilung voranzutreiben. Mit ihrer zweiten Intifada haben die Palästinenser das gleiche gesagt. Dieser Konflikt jedoch ist anders, denn dass die Raketen der Hisbollah täglich auf Israel niederregnen, stellte einen nicht tolerierbaren militärischen Übergriff ohne Ende dar.

Weizman: Contemporary military theorists are now busy re-conceptualizing the urban domain. At stake are the underlying concepts, assumptions and principles that determine military strategies and tactics. The vast intellectual field that geographer Stephen Graham has called an international ‘shadow world’ of military urban research institutes and training centres that have been established to rethink military operations in cities could be understood as somewhat similar to the international matrix of élite architectural academies. However, according to urban theorist Simon Marvin, the military-architectural ‘shadow world’ is currently generating more intense and well-funded urban research programmes than all these university programmes put together, and is certainly aware of the avant-garde urban research conducted in architectural institutions, especially as regards Third World and African cities. There is a considerable overlap among the theoretical texts considered essential by military academies and architectural schools. Indeed, the reading lists of contemporary military institutions include works from around 1968 (with a special emphasis on the writings of Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari and Guy Debord), as well as more contemporary writings on urbanism, psychology, cybernetics, post-colonial and post-Structuralist theory. If, as some writers claim, the space for criticality has withered away in late 20th-century capitalist culture, it seems now to have found a place to flourish in the military.

I conducted an interview with Kokhavi, commander of the Paratrooper Brigade, who at 42 is considered one of the most promising young officers of the IDF (and was the commander of the operation for the evacuation of settlements in the Gaza Strip).2 Like many career officers, he had taken time out from the military to earn a university degree; although he originally intended to study architecture, he ended up with a degree in philosophy from the Hebrew University. When he explained to me the principle that guided the battle in Nablus, what was interesting for me was not so much the description of the action itself as the way he conceived its articulation. He said: ‘this space that you look at, this room that you look at, is nothing but your interpretation of it. […] The question is how do you interpret the alley? […] We interpreted the alley as a place forbidden to walk through and the door as a place forbidden to pass through, and the window as a place forbidden to look through, because a weapon awaits us in the alley, and a booby trap awaits us behind the doors. This is because the enemy interprets space in a traditional, classical manner, and I do not want to obey this interpretation and fall into his traps. […] I want to surprise him! This is the essence of war. I need to win […] This is why that we opted for the methodology of moving through walls. . . . Like a worm that eats its way forward, emerging at points and then disappearing. […] I said to my troops, “Friends! […] If until now you were used to move along roads and sidewalks, forget it! From now on we all walk through walls!”’2 Kokhavi’s intention in the battle was to enter the city in order to kill members of the Palestinian resistance and then get out. The horrific frankness of these objectives, as recounted to me by Shimon Naveh, Kokhavi’s instructor, is part of a general Israeli policy that seeks to disrupt Palestinian resistance on political as well as military levels through targeted assassinations from both air and ground.

If you still believe, as the IDF would like you to, that moving through walls is a relatively gentle form of warfare, the following description of the sequence of events might change your mind. To begin with, soldiers assemble behind the wall and then, using explosives, drills or hammers, they break a hole large enough to pass through. Stun grenades are then sometimes thrown, or a few random shots fired into what is usually a private living-room occupied by unsuspecting civilians. When the soldiers have passed through the wall, the occupants are locked inside one of the rooms, where they are made to remain – sometimes for several days – until the operation is concluded, often without water, toilet, food or medicine. Civilians in Palestine, as in Iraq, have experienced the unexpected penetration of war into the private domain of the home as the most profound form of trauma and humiliation. A Palestinian woman identified only as Aisha, interviewed by a journalist for the Palestine Monitor, described the experience: ‘Imagine it – you’re sitting in your living-room, which you know so well; this is the room where the family watches television together after the evening meal, and suddenly that wall disappears with a deafening roar, the room fills with dust and debris, and through the wall pours one soldier after the other, screaming orders. You have no idea if they’re after you, if they’ve come to take over your home, or if your house just lies on their route to somewhere else. The children are screaming, panicking. Is it possible to even begin to imagine the horror experienced by a five-year-old child as four, six, eight, 12 soldiers, their faces painted black, sub-machine-guns pointed everywhere, antennas protruding from their backpacks, making them look like giant alien bugs, blast their way through that wall?’3

Naveh, a retired Brigadier-General, directs the Operational Theory Research Institute, which trains staff officers from the IDF and other militaries in ‘operational theory’ – defined in military jargon as somewhere between strategy and tactics. He summed up the mission of his institute, which was founded in 1996: ‘We are like the Jesuit Order. We attempt to teach and train soldiers to think. […] We read Christopher Alexander, can you imagine?; we read John Forester, and other architects. We are reading Gregory Bateson; we are reading Clifford Geertz. Not myself, but our soldiers, our generals are reflecting on these kinds of materials. We have established a school and developed a curriculum that trains “operational architects”.’4 In a lecture Naveh showed a diagram resembling a ‘square of opposition’ that plots a set of logical relationships between certain propositions referring to military and guerrilla operations. Labelled with phrases such as ‘Difference and Repetition – The Dialectics of Structuring and Structure’, ‘Formless Rival Entities’, ‘Fractal Manoeuvre’, ‘Velocity vs. Rhythms’, ‘The Wahabi War Machine’, ‘Postmodern Anarchists’ and ‘Nomadic Terrorists’, they often reference the work of Deleuze and Guattari. War machines, according to the philosophers, are polymorphous; diffuse organizations characterized by their capacity for metamorphosis, made up of small groups that split up or merge with one another, depending on contingency and circumstances. (Deleuze and Guattari were aware that the state can willingly transform itself into a war machine. Similarly, in their discussion of ‘smooth space’ it is implied that this conception may lead to domination.)

Goldhagen: Wie soll Israel – wie würde ein beliebiges Land – mit einem solchen Feind verfahren? Mit Ausnahme des verzweifelten Saddam Hussein während des Golfkriegs von 1991 haben andere Länder und Armeen, die Israel zerstören wollten, es nicht gewagt, israelische Städte zu bombardieren, weil sie wussten, dass Israel Kairo, Amman oder Damaskus umso intensiver bombardiert hätte. Israel vermochte abzuschrecken. (Seine nukleare Abschreckung bewegte Ägypten zum Friedensschluss.) Und selbst wenn ein Feind einen solchen Angriff gewagt hätte, würde Israel ihn zur Aufgabe genötigt haben, indem es ihm solange Schaden zufügte, bis er abgelassen hätte. Mit der Hisbollah – und in weiten Teilen ebenso mit der Hamas – hat Israel seine ersten beiden strategischen Optionen im Umgang mit einem aggressiven, gefährlichen Gegner eingebüßt: Abschreckung und Nötigung (die Zufügung massiver Zerstörung also). Das dritte strategische Mittel im Umgang mit einem Feind, ein aufrichtiger Friedensschluss, war niemals möglich, denn sowohl die Hisbollah als auch die Hamas haben sich aus religiöser und ideologischer Überzeugung, wie sie selbst sagen, Israels kompletter Zerstörung anheimgegeben und verstehen jede Einstellung der Feindseligkeiten als bloßes Zwischenspiel vor dem nächsten Angriff. Sechs Jahre nach dem Abzug Israels aus dem Libanon sah sich die Hisbollah, die ihr terroristisches Raketenarsenal ausgebaut hat, mit dem Angriff am Beginn der Erfüllung ihrer Wünsche. Ihr Führer Hassan Nasrallah erklärte, dieser Angriff sei “der Anfang vom Ende dieses Gebildes”.
Daher hat Israel die vierte strategische Option gewählt: seinen gefährlichen Gegner zu verheeren, was auch die Abschreckung wiederherstellen würde. Jedoch stellte Israel fest, dass es gegen einen terroristischen Gegner, dessen Mitglieder wie Zivilisten aussehen und dessen Raketen, die Israel aus der Ferne bedrohen, überall versteckt sind, länger kämpfen und viel größere Teile des Libanon besetzen und zerstören musste, als moralisch, klug oder auch nur praktikabel erschien. Daher die wochenlange Verzögerungstaktik. Doch selbst wenn Israel den südlichen Libanon besetzt hätte, hätte die Hisbollah ihre Kampfhandlungen fortgesetzt, die Raketenangriffe auf Israel eingeschlossen, und kein Ende war in Sicht.
Welche strategischen Möglichkeiten blieben? Die fünfte ist unerträglich: mit den anhaltenden, wahrscheinlich zunehmenden Raketenangriffen auf den Norden und möglicherweise auf das Herz des Landes zu leben – Nasrallah hat versprochen, dass es “viele Städte im Zentrum Israels gibt, die in der “Nach-Haifa-Phase’ ins Visier genommen” würden – wozu es früher oder, nach einem Zwischenspiel, später kommen kann.
Die sechste Option wäre die Wiederherstellung der Abschreckung durch die Nötigung derer, die die Hisbollah unterstützen und mit Nachschub versorgen, gewesen: Syrien und Iran. Keines dieser Länder will einen Krieg mit dem überlegenen Israel (Syriens Säbelrasseln zum Trotz). Sollten die Raketenangriffe der Hisbollah zu israelischen Vergeltungsmaßnahmen gegen Syrien und eventuell gegen den Iran (und seine Atomanlagen) führen, dann würden Syrien und Iran genötigt, die Hisbollah zu stoppen.
Offenkundig wäre diese strategische Option ein letzter Versuch, wenig reizvoll und mit seinen eigenen Risiken behaftet. Er würde zu einer enormen Eskalation des Konflikts führen und den Druck der internationalen Gemeinschaft auf Israel erhöhen. Allerdings hätte diese Option den Vorteil, dass sie mit der größten Wahrscheinlichkeit das langfristige Überleben Israels und, mag das auch nicht gleich eingängig erscheinen, ebenso den Frieden in der Region sichern würde, indem sie Israels anhaltende Fähigkeit zur Abschreckung bewiese. Auch hätte sie die andernfalls gewisse massive Zerstörung des Libanon verhindern können.

Weizman: I asked Naveh why Deleuze and Guattari were so popular with the Israeli military. He replied that ‘several of the concepts in A Thousand Plateaux became instrumental for us […] allowing us to explain contemporary situations in a way that we could not have otherwise. It problematized our own paradigms. Most important was the distinction they have pointed out between the concepts of “smooth” and “striated” space [which accordingly reflect] the organizational concepts of the “war machine” and the “state apparatus”. In the IDF we now often use the term “to smooth out space” when we want to refer to operation in a space as if it had no borders. […] Palestinian areas could indeed be thought of as “striated” in the sense that they are enclosed by fences, walls, ditches, roads blocks and so on.’5 When I asked him if moving through walls was part of it, he explained that, ‘In Nablus the IDF understood urban fighting as a spatial problem. […] Travelling through walls is a simple mechanical solution that connects theory and practice.’6

To understand the IDF’s tactics for moving through Palestinian urban spaces, it is necessary to understand how they interpret the by now familiar principle of ‘swarming’ – a term that has been a buzzword in military theory since the start of the US post cold War doctrine known as the Revolution in Military Affairs. The swarm manoeuvre was in fact adapted, from the Artificial Intelligence principle of swarm intelligence, which assumes that problem-solving capacities are found in the interaction and communication of relatively unsophisticated agents (ants, birds, bees, soldiers) with little or no centralized control. The swarm exemplifies the principle of non-linearity apparent in spatial, organizational and temporal terms. The traditional manoeuvre paradigm, characterized by the simplified geometry of Euclidean order, is transformed, according to the military, into a complex fractal-like geometry. The narrative of the battle plan is replaced by what the military, using a Foucaultian term, calls the ‘toolbox approach’, according to which units receive the tools they need to deal with several given situations and scenarios but cannot predict the order in which these events would actually occur.7 Naveh: ‘Operative and tactical commanders depend on one another and learn the problems through constructing the battle narrative; […] action becomes knowledge, and knowledge becomes action. […] Without a decisive result possible, the main benefit of operation is the very improvement of the system as a system.’8

This may explain the fascination of the military with the spatial and organizational models and modes of operation advanced by theorists such as Deleuze and Guattari. Indeed, as far as the military is concerned, urban warfare is the ultimate Postmodern form of conflict. Belief in a logically structured and single-track battle-plan is lost in the face of the complexity and ambiguity of the urban reality. Civilians become combatants, and combatants become civilians. Identity can be changed as quickly as gender can be feigned: the transformation of women into fighting men can occur at the speed that it takes an undercover ‘Arabized’ Israeli soldier or a camouflaged Palestinian fighter to pull a machine-gun out from under a dress. For a Palestinian fighter caught up in this battle, Israelis seem ‘to be everywhere: behind, on the sides, on the right and on the left. How can you fight that way?’9

Critical theory has become crucial for Nave’s teaching and training. He explained: ‘we employ critical theory primarily in order to critique the military institution itself – its fixed and heavy conceptual foundations. Theory is important for us in order to articulate the gap between the existing paradigm and where we want to go. Without theory we could not make sense of the different events that happen around us and that would otherwise seem disconnected. […] At present the Institute has a tremendous impact on the military; [it has] become a subversive node within it. By training several high-ranking officers we filled the system [IDF] with subversive agents […] who ask questions; […] some of the top brass are not embarrassed to talk about Deleuze or [Bernard] Tschumi.’10 I asked him, ‘Why Tschumi?’ He replied: ‘The idea of disjunction embodied in Tschumi’s book Architecture and Disjunction (1994) became relevant for us […] Tschumi had another approach to epistemology; he wanted to break with single-perspective knowledge and centralized thinking. He saw the world through a variety of different social practices, from a constantly shifting point of view. [Tschumi] created a new grammar; he formed the ideas that compose our thinking.11 I then asked him, why not Derrida and Deconstruction? He answered, ‘Derrida may be a little too opaque for our crowd. We share more with architects; we combine theory and practice. We can read, but we know as well how to build and destroy, and sometimes kill.’12

Goldhagen: Welche strategischen Möglichkeiten Israel auch hatte, alle waren sie schlecht oder unwirksam oder nicht wünschenswert. Und nun ist, als vermeintlicher “deus ex machina”, eine Uno-Resolution verabschiedet worden, die eine internationale Truppe südlich des Litani-Flusses vorsieht, mit einem Mandat, die raketenbewehrte Hisbollah zu verdrängen, nicht aber sie zu entwaffnen. Auch wenn sich damit eine neue, siebte strategische Option ergibt, die einen neuen strategischen Mitspieler bringt, der die Region möglicherweise stabilisieren und ein neues Sicherheitsparadigma schaffen könnte, könnte sich die Entwicklung als gefährliche Niederlage Israels erweisen. Denn selbst wenn die internationale Truppe ihre Aufgabe, die Hisbollah aus diesem südlichsten Teil des Libanon fernzuhalten, ernsthaft angeht, bleibt der Norden Israels in Reichweite der Raketen der Hisbollah (die sich mit der Zeit nur vergrößern wird). Die Hisbollah kann einen Guerillakrieg gegen die internationale Truppe führen, der es womöglich an den erforderlichen Mitteln fehlt, um sich durchzusetzen. Zudem würde sie der Hisbollah gestatten, fortzubestehen, sich mit der Hilfe Syriens und Irans neu zu bewaffnen und zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt anzugreifen – und dabei in den Augen der arabischen Welt das stolze Symbol des Triumphs zu bleiben, ein Drittel Israels terrorisiert und die Juden dort zur Flucht gezwungen zu haben.
Man gebe sich keiner Täuschung hin. Israel hat um sein Überleben gekämpft. Unerwartet. Denn es steht vor einem historisch neuen fanatischen Feind, dem politischen Islam, den dreierlei charakterisiert: eine politisch-religiöse Ideologie, die die Vernichtung ihrer Gegner fordert; Gleichgültigkeit, ja sogar Freude angesichts des Todes seiner Anhänger, denn Märtyrer werden mit einem Platz im Himmel belohnt; und eine buchstäblich unaufhaltsame Technologie (Raketen) und Technik (Selbstmordattentate) des Terrors. Das Schreckgespenst endlosen Terrors und endlosen Kriegs sucht Israel heim und droht es zu verkrüppeln.
Den politischen Islamisten hat ihre neu entdeckte Macht Auftrieb gegeben. Nasrallahs Prahlerei hallt in der ganzen arabische Welt wider. Dort, insbesondere in der Palästinensischen Autonomiebehörde, wird Nasrallah als Held gefeiert, der einen neuen Weg zur Zerstörung Israels gewiesen hat. So erklärte der palästinensische Kulturminister Atallah Abu al-Sabah anlässlich einer Kundgebung für die Hisbollah: “Die Redensart, Israel sei hier, um zu bleiben, hat sich als falsch erwiesen.” “Israel kann besiegt werden”, fuhr er fort, “und das ist es, was die arabischen Regierungen wissen sollten. Es ist an der Zeit, die arabischen Waffen zu entstauben und sie zu nutzen, um Palästina und die al-Aksa-Moschee zu befreien.” Und die Gefährlichkeit des politischen Islam wird sich noch tausendfach erhöhen, wenn der Iran, Epizentrum des politischen Islam und Herr der Hisbollah, sich mit Nuklearwaffen selbst so unverwundbar macht, dass er Raketenangriffe und andere Attacken gegen seine vielen Angriffsziele wagen kann – angefangen mit Israel, das, wie der iranische Präsident Mahmud Ahmadi-Nedschad wiederholt erklärt hat, vernichtet werden müsse, und über das der einflussreiche ehemalige Präsident Haschemi Rafsandschani 2001 rundheraus gesagt hat: “Die Anwendung einer einzigen Atombombe würde Israel völlig zerstören”, während sie der islamischen Welt nur begrenzten Schaden zufügen würde. “Es ist nicht unvernünftig”, fügte er hinzu, “eine solche Möglichkeit in Erwägung zu ziehen.”

Weizman: In addition to these theoretical positions, Naveh references such canonical elements of urban theory as the Situationist practices of dérive (a method of drifting through a city based on what the Situationists referred to as ‘psycho-geography’) and détournement (the adaptation of abandoned buildings for purposes other than those they were designed to perform). These ideas were, of course, conceived by Guy Debord and other members of the Situationist International to challenge the built hierarchy of the capitalist city and break down distinctions between private and public, inside and outside, use and function, replacing private space with a ‘borderless’ public surface. References to the work of Georges Bataille, either directly or as cited in the writings of Tschumi, also speak of a desire to attack architecture and to dismantle the rigid rationalism of a postwar order, to escape ‘the architectural strait-jacket’ and to liberate repressed human desires.
In no uncertain terms, education in the humanities – often believed to be the most powerful weapon against imperialism – is being appropriated as a powerful vehicle for imperialism. The military’s use of theory is, of course, nothing new – a long line extends all the way from Marcus Aurelius to General Patton. Future military attacks on urban terrain will increasingly be dedicated to the use of technologies developed for the purpose of ‘un-walling the wall’, to borrow a term from Gordon Matta-Clark. This is the new soldier/architect’s response to the logic of ‘smart bombs’. The latter have paradoxically resulted in higher numbers of civilian casualties simply because the illusion of precision gives the military-political complex the necessary justification to use explosives in civilian environments.

Here another use of theory as the ultimate ‘smart weapon’ becomes apparent. The military’s seductive use of theoretical and technological discourse seeks to portray war as remote, quick and intellectual, exciting – and even economically viable. Violence can thus be projected as tolerable and the public encouraged to support it. As such, the development and dissemination of new military technologies promote the fiction being projected into the public domain that a military solution is possible – in situations where it is at best very doubtful.

Although you do not need Deleuze to attack Nablus, theory helped the military reorganize by providing a new language in which to speak to itself and others. A ‘smart weapon’ theory has both a practical and a discursive function in redefining urban warfare. The practical or tactical function, the extent to which Deleuzian theory influences military tactics and manoeuvres, raises questions about the relation between theory and practice. Theory obviously has the power to stimulate new sensibilities, but it may also help to explain, develop or even justify ideas that emerged independently within disparate fields of knowledge and with quite different ethical bases. In discursive terms, war – if it is not a total war of annihilation – constitutes a form of discourse between enemies. Every military action is meant to communicate something to the enemy. Talk of ‘swarming’, ‘targeted killings’ and ‘smart destruction’ help the military communicate to its enemies that it has the capacity to effect far greater destruction. Raids can thus be projected as the more moderate alternative to the devastating capacity that the military actually possesses and will unleash if the enemy exceeds the ‘acceptable’ level of violence or breaches some unspoken agreement. In terms of military operational theory it is essential never to use one’s full destructive capacity but rather to maintain the potential to escalate the level of atrocity. Otherwise threats become meaningless.

Goldhagen: Ein Iran mit Atomwaffen, der den Hass von Hisbollah und Hamas auf Israels bloße Existenz teilt, wäre eine millionenfach reichere, destruktivere Hisbollah, die viele Hisbollahs mehr gründen, finanzieren und mit Nachschub versorgen könnte, um viele Feinde mehr zu bedrohen, darunter die westlichen Länder, die von Ahmadi-Nedschad und den Mullahs mit kaum geringerer Leidenschaft gehasst werden.
Was immer die Kämpfe gebracht haben mögen, die anhaltende Folge dieses Konflikts ist Israels große Verletzlichkeit: mit einfachen und billigen Raketen und Terroristen, die den Märtyrertod suchen, können seine Feinde praktisch das ganze, geografisch winzige Land lähmen. Die Innenstadt von Tel Aviv ist nur zwanzig Kilometer vom Westjordanland entfernt. Israels Feinde aus den Reihen des politischen Islam verstehen die neue geostrategische Situation und frohlocken. Die Zerstörung Israels, einst ein fernes Ziel, das einen langen Kampf lohnte, scheint ihnen nun in greifbarer Nähe. Die Aussicht wiederum, sie könnten sich auf einen endgültigen Frieden mit Israel einlassen, verringert sich entsprechend.
Auch die entfernteren Angriffsziele dieser totalitären Geister – alle “Ungläubigen” insbesondere in den Vereinigten Staaten und Europa – sollten jetzt die neue geostrategische Situation analysieren und ernüchtert erkennen, dass Israel, indem es diesen Verteidigungskrieg führt, um das geostrategische Gleichgewicht wiederherzustellen und sein langfristiges Überleben zu sichern, am Ende auch um ihretwillen gekämpft hat.

Weizman: When the military talks theory to itself, it seems to be about changing its organizational structure and hierarchies. When it invokes theory in communications with the public – in lectures, broadcasts and publications – it seems to be about projecting an image of a civilized and sophisticated military. And when the military ‘talks’ (as every military does) to the enemy, theory could be understood as a particularly intimidating weapon of ‘shock and awe’, the message being: ‘You will never even understand that which kills you.’

Daniel Jonah Goldhagen ist Mitarbeiter des Zentrums für Europäische Studien an der Universität Harvard und Autor von “Hitlers willige Vollstrecker”.

Eyal Weizman is an architect, writer and Director of Goldsmith’s College Centre for Research Architecture. His work deals with issues of conflict territories and human rights.

1 Quoted in Hannan Greenberg, ‘The Limited Conflict: This Is How You Trick Terrorists’, in Yediot Aharonot; (23 March 2004)
2 Eyal Weizman interviewed Aviv Kokhavi on 24 September at an Israeli military base near Tel Aviv. Translation from Hebrew by the author; video documentation by Nadav Harel and Zohar Kaniel
3 Sune Segal, ‘What Lies Beneath: Excerpts from an Invasion’, Palestine Monitor, November, 2002; 9 June, 2005
4 Shimon Naveh, discussion following the talk ‘Dicta Clausewitz: Fractal Manoeuvre: A Brief History of Future Warfare in Urban Environments’, delivered in conjunction with ‘States of Emergency: The Geography of Human Rights’, a debate organized by Eyal Weizman and Anselm Franke as part of ‘Territories Live’, B’tzalel Gallery, Tel Aviv,
5 November 2004
5 Eyal Weizman, telephone interview with Shimon Naveh, 14 October 2005
6 Ibid.
7 Michel Foucault’s description of theory as a ‘toolbox’ was originally developed in conjunction with Deleuze in a 1972 discussion; see Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, ‘Intellectuals and Power’, in Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. and intro. Donald F. Bouchard, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1980, p. 206
8 Weizman, interview with Naveh
9 Quoted in Yagil Henkin, ‘The Best Way into Baghdad’, The New York Times, 3 April 2003
10 Weizman, interview with Naveh
11 Naveh is currently working on a Hebrew translation of Bernard Tschumi’s Architecture and Disjunction, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1997.
12 Weizman, interview with Naveh


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